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Emerging citizenship on YouTube: activism, satire and online debate around the anti-Islam video

Fitna.
Abstract:
In this article we examine the hundreds of videos that were posted to YouTube in response to the fierce anti-Islam video Fitna. We use this case to analyse whether and how the participatory opportunities of the digital technologies invite performances of citizenship, especially with respect to the articulation of religious and/or political identity. The sheer numbers of YouTube activities (videos, views and comments) demonstrated that this was not at all a marginal phenomenon within the wider Fitna and Wilders controversy, making the question as to what these videos mean, or -to be more precise -for which contexts the posters make them meaningful, all the more pressing. We used the concepts of 'voice', 'performance' and 'citizenship' to approach this issue and found that the video genres unique to visual digital culture (tagging/jamming, cut-and-mix and vlogs) each invited their own kinds of political and religious performances, and assumed particular traits and interests of their audience. The most common YouTube reaction for Muslims was to upload copies of videos that expressed their own understanding of Islam as a peaceful religion in contrast to the picture drawn by
Wilders. The jamming videos saying sorry were unique digital means of activism, enabling a particular participation in the controversy around Fitna that assumed a global audience open to apology. The cut-and-mix videos, appeared to be especially welcome means for satire and parody and appealing to audience emotions, but also for the deconstruction of Fitna which addressed audience cognitive competence. Vlogging about Fitna, was often part of a more regular practice of video production that was individually or institutionally maintained. We conclude that the particular articulations of religious and political identities, with different modes of audience address assume a connectedness between dispersed people in which new forms of(unlocated) citizenship emerge. 2 Before we present our data, we will introduce the theories that inform our approach and research questions.
Voice and the performance of citizenship
Coverage of the Fitna controversies in the Dutch and UK offline news media (press and television) was typified by two things: first, reports, analyses and comments focused on the problems that Wilders had to get his video distributed as well as whether public broadcasters in the Netherlands had the right to refuse to show the film; moreover, whether the ban by the UK Home office was appropriate; or indeed whether the Turkish government could legitimately decline to receive
Wilders. The coverage thus focused much more on the issue of freedom of speech than on the film's portrayal of Islam (Ruigrok et al, 2009; Knott, Poole and Taira, 2010 Ruigrok et al, 2009; Knott, Poole and Taira, 2010) . The absence of ordinary citizens, however, is not particular to the Fitna controversy but is a generic feature of all mass mediated news whether about
Islam (Poole and Richardson 2006; Richardson, 2004) , or about other matters (Ericson et al., 1989) .
Within this context of a news agenda that limited the debate to elite actors who predominantly focus on freedom of speech, it is not surprising that the Internet offered a much used opportunity for people to present their particular take on Fitna. The democratic affordances of the Internet have always been a key appeal to political activists and scientists alike. From its very early years as a public medium, the Internet has attracted grass roots activism, bottom-up discussions, and religious reflection (see Chadwick and Howard, 2009 , for a useful overview). In fact, religion was and is one of the most important reasons for people to go online, look for shared religious and spiritual experiences and engage in communal activities (e.g. Barna, 2001; Bunt, 2009; Hoover, Schofield Clark and Rainie, 2004 claiming that it provides a platform without an audience, and produces talk without consequence. Keren (2006) , for instance, claims in his analysis of the blogosphere that blogging might be seen as an expression of dissatisfaction with 'social control and manipulation by powerful political, corporate and media forces' (p. 149), and 'an attempt to restore a degree of authenticity, expressing some inner truth' (ibid). It is, however, a truth without impact, according to Keren, 'largely because of the virtual nature of the endeavor' (p. 152) which would divert bloggers into a fantasy world of words that do not ask nor need a response from the powers they resist. claims that by doing gender one becomes a woman or a man (e.g. Butler, 1990) .
Such a dark vision of Internet voices is built on the assumption that a voice is
Such a concept as citizenship as performative is especially relevant in contexts where there is no preset geographical entity or polity to be part of, particularly with respect to issues of global relevance and interest such as Fitna. In line with public sphere theory we could argue that public debates on such global matters cannot be considered fully legitimate if they do not allow for equal exchange with all affected, regardless of formal citizenship (cf. Frazer 2007) . For obvious reasons, traditional media, operating within nationally-bounded communicative spheres, are not particularly well equipped for complying with the 'all affected' principle when dealing with issues of transnational relevance. Indeed, both in the UK and in Netherlands, mainstream debates about Fitna largely excluded Muslims (Ruigrok et al, 2009; Knott, Poole and Taira, 2010) . While not without its own drawbacks, YouTube proved well-suited for enabling an exchange among a wide range of those affected by Fitna, serving as a platform for a virtual and dispersed community constructed and defined through the articulation and interpretation of Fitna and Geert Wilders. Through making and uploading a video, posters performed an act or practice which constitutes them as part of this placeless public. Even if no-one is paying attention to this performance, the first relevance is nevertheless for the actor him or herself, who takes him or herself seriously as a stakeholder in a controversy that is otherwise played out on the distant stages of the mass media. Van Zoonen (2005 has analysed online discussions about Hollywood and other political film and TV fiction in a similar vein, approaching the individual comments in these discussions as performances through which people construct 'political selves', that can be ideological, reasonable or utopian (see also Eliasoph, 1998) . In the context of religion, it is likely that online postings (whether verbal or visual) also involve the performance of a religious self, inserted in or taking issue with religious authority (cf.
Lövheim and Linderman 2005, Cheong, Halavais and Kwon, 2008). Since Fitna's message is that
Muslims cannot be full citizens in contemporary Dutch society on their own terms and must be fully assimilated, and the same applies to other societies with a Christian-Judeo tradition, according to Wilders, their video responses on YouTube may, in fact, involve a performance that inserts them both as citizens within a national context and debate, as well as within the global controversies around Islam, and moreover as legitimate interpreters of their own religion.
Approaching the YouTube videos as performances through which people perform a political or religious self, makes it possible to put the question of who is actually listening temporarily between brackets, 4 and focus instead on who participates and how. While Isin and Nielsen pertain that it is necessary to ask how these performances gain audibility and visibility (p.3), the preceding issue, and our first research question, is what kind of selves people produce through uploading their videos against or in favor of Fitna. In addition, a second relevant question is whether these videos can also be considered as performances of citizenship in this placeless community constituted by
Fitna. Therefore, we cannot only examine how the posters claim their right to speak and perform their political and religious selves, but also need to assess in which context they assume their We conducted a quantitative and qualitative content analysis using different indicators and data to assess whether and how these videos claim their right to speak and which audiences they assumed. In order to get an overall view of the videos and a general sense of their features, we made a quantitative inventory based on the metadata from the e-tool 
Who is reacting to Fitna, in what way and with what message?
Most of the videos carrying one of our search terms were uploaded close to the release data of Fitna.
The average length of the videos is about 5 minutes, the average number of views is about 24.000 with a minimum of 40 for the least watched video (one of the Sorry-videos, see below) and a maximum of about 3,6 million for the most watched video, a piece to camera of an American standup comedian expressing his pride in being Muslim. In total over 10 million viewers watched one or more videos from our corpus, with almost 250.000 comments made altogether. These numbers show that YouTube was not a marginal platform in the controversy about Fitna. In combination with the data about the country of origin as registered by the posters, it also becomes clear that YouTube offered a global platform with almost half of the videos uploaded from the Netherlands, the US and the UK, and the other half from countries across the globe. 9 The average age of the posters, as far as they listed it, was 32 years old, 82,5% of them registered as men, 9 % as women, and 8,5 % as The general, quantitative insight into which political and religious selves are performed and in which way, can be specified further by a qualitative analysis of the three genres unique to online culture:
jamming, cut-and-mix, and vlogging.
Jamming and saying sorry
In the wealth of YouTube uploads, videos explicitly saying 'Sorry' for Wilders' film were the easiest to frame as a performance of a political self that constructs its makers both as citizens of the Dutch nation state, and as people with a desire to speak and apologize to a global audience. These videos were part of a concerted action of a Dutch avant-garde multimedia company in Amsterdam,
Mediamatic, that launched an initiative to make many movies called 'Fitna', already before Fitna was actually released:
"Why? Well we can't stop Wilders. … Actually, we do not want to stop his movie because we cherish our freedom of expression. Even stupid populist politicians have fundamental rights.
Especially they! We can compete for attention however. And we can produce disinformation.
So we are going to make Movies called "Fitna" in which we apologise for Geert Wilders embarrassing behavior. We will make so many of them that it will be hard to find the movie by
Wilders without finding lots of movies apologizing for it…. Let's smother this Wilders in our apologies. If we work hard enough, no one will be able to find his crap among all the noise we produce. And the world knows how we feel about Wilders and his opportunism."
15
Mediamatic also organized offline events to enable people to make short sorry-videos and the initiative was reported in most Dutch newspapers. These videos usually last no longer than 15 to 20 seconds. They look and sound like amateur recording and come in three standard forms: in the first type we see one or more persons wearing a blond wig (as a parody on Wilders' bleached hairdo) saying, singing and often giggling 'sorry', in front of a black-on-white wall text reading 'I am sorry'; the second type shows uses a screen wide carton Dutch flag with a round whole in it through which a person puts his or her face and says 'I am sorry'; the third type shows takes from an outdoor manifestation in which people carrying the wig say 'sorry' in the camera.
All these videos were given the labels 'Geert Wilders', 'Fitna' and 'Sorry', and they come up when one searches YouTube for 'Geert Wilders' and 'Fitna'. The numbers of views and comments suggest that this collective effort to jam Fitna and offer an immediate antidote has been successful. or as himself in parliament with a funny sounding voice-over claiming that he will ban Sesame Street.
In more aggressive attacks on Wilders, his video is compared to the propaganda of the Nazi's, which happens for instance in cut-and-mix productions called 'Adolf Wilders Fitna', or 'Geert Hitler'. One whole channel is specifically dedicated to making anti Geert Wilders videos, and is maintained by someone called 'verwildering', which is a Dutch pun on Wilders' name which means degradation or dehumanization. One such video is a still picture of Wilders combined with a traffic ban sign, and a parental advisory sticker and a swastika pasted over Wilders' face. The image is uploaded three times with different audio-messages: one techno house rap ('when you run into Wilders, slap that Bitch'), one Afghan rap ('Jihad on my mind when I pop at ya, I think you're blind, check you're optical') and another 'diss' rap ('middle finger in the sky for Geert Wilders'). 18 As these examples show, the cut-and-mix videos are often the product of young individuals using the codes and conventions of youth and popular culture to make their point, in more or less sophisticated ways.
The style of choice is parody and satire, morphing of pictures and 'dissing' (putting someone down)
in videos that take their inspiration from rap genres. The argumentation is usually not very elaborate (in one video the main text is 'we don't want discrimination' 19 ), but through sound, visuals and lyrics strong critical emotions (anger, fear) against Wilders are expressed.
There are a notable exceptions to his general tendency in the cut-and-mix videos, and those concern the Bible versions of Fitna, titled, for instance,
Fitna (Bible version), Fitna the movie (what about the bible?) Geert wilders the movie Fitna "Bible version", or Fitna-Schism (The Bible version of Fitna).
Of these, the latter -Schism -is the best-known and most popular one,, which we found reuploaded nine times in our corpus. It was made by Saoudi blogger Raed Al Saeed: 'This is a movie I made in less than 24 hours in response to Geert Wilders's Anti-Islam Movie "Fitna"', the argument being that it is easy to make such videos with other holy books. 20 The video shows footage of American soldiers beating up civilians in their compound and a US evangelic group led by a blonde woman teaching children to become soldiers for the Christian war. When he posted his video on YouTube, it was first removed for 'having inappropriate content', but after Al Saeed claimed that While the satirical cut-and-mix videos basically make an appeal to audience emotions such as anger or contempt, the Bible versions of Fitna are built on the assumption that it can be explained and shown to audiences that Fitna is a demagogic representation of Islam, and that such negative propaganda can be produced using the Bible as a source as well. It is an appeal to cognition and reason of audiences.
Testimonials
The Sorry videos and the cut-and-mix productions were made specifically to react to Fitna. 
Discussion
In this contribution, we claimed that the current multimedia environment makes it necessary and possible to think of citizenship as a performance, in addition to citizenship as a status within the boundaries of a nation state, or as an acknowledged identity within a more or less demarcated polity. We approached the videos uploaded in response to Fitna, as acts and practices in a placeless public debate, in which people claimed their right to speak and perform their political and/or religious selves, in connection to an assumed audience. It is in connection to these assumed audiences that citizenship may or not may emerge. As Hartley suggests in this volume, citizenship can be approached as ´an association of strangers´, and in the case of our YouTube videos the question thus is whether and how this association with the ´stranger/audience' is enabled by the videos. We classic modernist understanding of citizenship, addressing others equally well informed or -at leastwilling to be informed . It ties these videos and vlogs about Fitna, to a classic conceptualization of the public sphere, as the term 'vlogosphere' as it has been called in analogy with the blogopshere (Griffith and Papacharissi, 2010) suggests.
These cases demonstrate that the YouTube videos cannot be typified as enabling one kind of citizenship performance; we found several ones instead that nevertheless have one thing in common and that is their assumption about an audience out there. This implies a fundamental 'connectedness' of the YouTube performances that takes two forms: that of real connections to an already existing practice of religious and political participation, as is clear from the videos connected to the vlogosphere and from the many online manifestations of Islamic faith, and that of individual, one-off acts of video participation in the Fitna controversy and the assumed virtual audience. A desire to make a connection to dispersed others is thus what binds both the occasional acts and embedded practices of political and religious performance in reaction to Fitna on YouTube. A further commonality is that these attempts are molded in cognitive, emotional, humorous, denigrating, amiable, absurdist and other ways, but that none of them were violent or aggressive. Although we found many references to Wilders as Hitler, we did not find videos actually engaging in neo-Nazist hate speech; similarly, while many videos showed Islamist terrorism there were none in our data that supported extremist Islamism and propagated violence. Obviously, such videos do exist, but they did not come up in this YouTube debate. As the initial removal of the Schism video suggests, this maybe as much the result of enforcement of the YouTube user guidelines, as it could be of the way the posters want to make connections, within the admittedly wide boundaries of online civility (Papacharissi, 2004) .
We propose, in closing, that it is in this context of such attempts at 'connectivity' that the online performance of political and religious selves can become particular acts and practices of (unlocated) citizenship; citizenship that is not defined by its relation to an institutional or communal entity, but that takes its form with respect to dispersed other people, in the double sense of that word. In the classic 'rights' and 'obligations' terminology of citizenship, and articulated with the affordances of YouTube, this would involve both the right to speak/show and the obligation to listen/watch. While the sheer numbers of production and consumption of the videos suggest that
that is exactly what happened with the Fitna responses, such a notion of citizenship as connectivity need to be further explored by looking at the particular patterns of interaction between the posters and their audiences, as they subscribe to each others channels, react to each others videos and discuss among each other. These are the questions for a subsequent investigation about the YouTube responses to Fitna.
